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INSURANCE - DEFENSES OF LIABILITY INSURER AGAINST THIRD p ARTY
INJURED BY AssuRED UNDER STATUTE GIVING INJURED PARTY RIGHT OF
ACTION AGAINST INSURER - CONSTITUTIONALITY - Plaintiff, having recovered a judgment against insured defendant for injuries sustained in an auto-
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mobile accident, filed a supplemental bill against defendant's insurer to recover
the 'insurance money. The statute granting plaintiff this right provides that
whenever damage occurs for which the insured is responsible, the liability of the
insurer "shall become absolute," and upon his obtaining a judgment against the
assured, the injured person shall be entitled to have the insurance money applied
to satisfy the judgment.1 The insurer defended on the ground that the insured
violated a condition of the policy by failing to cooperate in the defense of the
damage suit. Held, two justices dissenting, that violation of this condition by the
assured was a valid defense under the statute. Conold v. Stern, 138 Ohio St.
352, 35 N. E. (2d) 133 (1941).
Third parties injured by an insured tortfeasor have met two formidable barriers to recovery of compensation from a liability insurer of the tortfeasor. One,
illustrated by the principal case, is a clause in the policy requiring the insured's
cooperation in the defense as a condition of recovery. 2 The other barrier arises
if the policy is one of indemnity against loss as distinguished from one insuring
against liability. If the policy insures the tortfeasor against liability, the obligation of the insurer to pay the insured arises when judgment is rendered against
the latter, and garnishment is available to the personal injury judgment creditor.3
On the other hand, if the policy merely insures against loss, an injured person
acquires no rights under the policy at common law,4 for the insurer's obligation
is contingent upon payment of the judgment by the insured. Thus, garnishment
is unavailing, for no money is due the insured, and if the insured is uncollectible,
the insurer is released, while the injured person is left uncompensated. 5 This
barrier, however, has been removed effectively by statutes which prohibit these
so-called "no action" clauses and which give the injured person a remedy against
the tortfeasor's insurer. The statute in the principal case is such an enactment,
having its origin in a Massachusetts statute 6 which was interpreted by the court
of that state as prohibiting "no action" clauses, but not precluding other defenses
such as the breach of conditions of notice or cooperation. 7 Statutes in other states
have accomplished a like result. 8 In spite of the plain wording of the Ohio
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), §§ 9510-3, 9510-4.
See 33 CoL. L. REv. 1414 (1933) for a discussion of this barrier.
8
Anoka Lumber Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 63 Minn. 286, 65 N. W. 353
(1895); Michel v. American Fire & Casualty Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) 82 F. (2d)
583.
4 VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., § 178 (1930); and see 25 CoL. L. REv. 661
(1925).
5
Poe v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., II8 Md. 347, 84 A. 476 (1912). But a
minority have held that an insurer who defended the suit against the insured could
not insist on payment of the judgment despite a "no action" clause. Patterson v.
Adan, II9 Minn. 308, 138 N. W. 281 (1912); VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., § 178
(1930); 46 HARV. L. REv. 1325 (1933).
6
Mass. Acts (1914), c. 464, §§ 1, 2, as amended, Mass. Ann. Laws (1933), c.
175, §§ II2, II3.
7
Lorando v. Gethro, 228 Mass. 181, II7 N. E. 185 (1917).
8
E.g., N. Y. Ins. Law of 1909, c. 33, § 109, was an early New York act which
furnished a model for many subsequent statutes. It gave the personal injury judgment
creditor in case of insolvency of assured a right of action against insurer "under the
terms of the policy." The present New York statute is found in 27 N. Y. Consol. Laws
i
2
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statute,0 and the unequivocal language of the other similar statutes, the Ohio
court, and the courts of the other states, are unanimous in interpreting the provisions so as to permit defenses against the injured person arising from insured's
breach of conditions of notice or cooperation. 10 It results, therefore, that while
one of the barriers mentioned is lowered, the other, illustrated by the successful
defense in the principal case, remains, standing. 11 The majority in the principal
case, in permitting the defense of noncooperation, suggests that the statute must
be so interpreted, "Otherwise, the statute would violate the due process clause
of the Constitution." 12 Since the statute is not retroactive and parties contract
with constructive knowledge of its terms,1 3 the only constitutional objection to
interpreting that statute as abolishing the defense would seem to be that it constitutes an unreasonable limitation on the freedom of contract. Curtailment of
this freedom of parties to a contract of insurance has been recognized as valid
if a reasonable regulation in the public interest and welfare.14 Outside of the
principal case, little has been said concerning the constitutionality of a bar to the
insurer's defenses against the injured person because of assured's breach of
cooperation or notice conditions.15 However, these very restrictions have been
(McKinney, 1940), § 167. Other statutes are compared in 76 A. L. R. 23 at 216 et
seq. (1932); 85 A. L. R. 20 at 70 (1933); I06 A. L. R. 516 at 532 (1937); and
see note in 46 HARV. L. REv. 1325 (1933).
9 "No such contract of insurance shall be cancelled or annulled by any agreement
between the insurance company and the assured.•••" Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938),
§ 9510-3. See Stacey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 114 Ohio St. 633, 151 N. E. 718
(1926).
10 Lorando v. Gethro, 228 Mass. 181, 117 N. E. 185 (1917); Stacey v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 114 Ohio St. 633, 151 N. E. 718 (1926); Federal Automobile Ins.
Assn. v. Abrams, 217 Ala. 539, 117 So. 85 (1928); 85 A. L. R. 20 at 74 (1933).
11 See 33 CoL. L. REv. 1414 (1933).
12 138 Ohio St. 352 at 359. A ground for sustaining the majority not mentioned
in the case is that the legislature adopted the Massachusetts construction of the statute.
In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Nadler, 115 Ohio St. 472 at 476, 154 N. E. 736
(1926), the Ohio court, when interpreting other words of the same statute, said,
"Where a statute is adopted from another state, which statute previous to such adoption
has been construed by the courts of that state, it is presumed to be adopted with the
construction so given it."
18 Lorando v. Gethro, 228 Mass. 181 at 190, 117 N. E. 185 (1917).
14 In Lorando v. Gethro, 228 Mass. 181, 117 N. E. 185 (1917), the prohibition
of a "no action" clause was held to be a reasonable regulation and constitutional.
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71, 43 S. Ct. 32 (1922), illustrates a rather drastic curtailment of this freedom. A statute was held valid which provided that an insurer against loss by hail shall be bound from 24 hours after the
taking of an application by its local agent unless notice is given to the contrary within
that period.
15 Stacey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 114 Ohio St. 633, 151 N. E. 718 (1926),
seems to be the only authority which relies heavily on constitutional considerations to
justify its interpretation of the statute as it is interpreted in the principal case. The
majority opinion in the principal case cites this case, but the dissent point out that
much of the opinion in the Stacey case indicates failure by the court to realize that
the statute was not retroactive. It is interesting that Chief Justice Weygandt joins
in this dissent, although he had previously concurred in an opinion in Luntz v. Stern,
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held constitutional if imposed in respect to compulsory liability insurance.16 The
principal case distinguishes a voluntary policy from a compulsory policy on the
ground that a different intent is manifested by the legislature,17 but no distinction on constitutional grounds is attempted. Legislative removal of this barrier
to the injured person's recovery on the tortfeasor's voluntary insurance would
seem as reasonable as the like provision if the insurance is compulsory. At least
no sufficient distinction is apparent to justify different conclusions as to constitutionality.

135 Ohio St. 225, 20 N. E. (2d) 241 (1939), which affirmed the traditional interpretation of the statute. A dictum in George v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.,
219 Ala. 307 at 311, 122 So. 175 (1929), states the traditional interpretation of the
statute similar to the one in the principal case "is necessary to save the constitutionality
of the act, so as to enable parties freely to stipulate the terms of their contract." In
Lorando v. Gethro, 228 Mass. 181 at 186, 117 N. E. 185 (1917), it was said that if
the statute did more than prohibit "no action" clauses, it "would present a constitutional
question quite different."
16 Massachusetts alone has required liability insurance of all automobile owners,
and the statute provides as to this insurance, "no violation of the terms of the policy .••
shall operate to defeat or avoid the policy so as to bar recovery within the limit provided
in the policy by a judgment creditor.•••" Mass. Ann. Laws (1933), c. 175, §
113A(5). Not only was the requirement of insurance held valid as to all automobile
owners, but it was held that this restriction on the insurer's freedom to contract was
constitutional. Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569 at 607, 147 N. E. 681
( I 92 5). The same restriction has been held valid if imposed upon parties to a policy
which is required of carriers for hire. Kruger v. California Highway IndemnityExchange,
201 Cal. 672, 258 P. 602 (1927), cert. den., 275 U.S. 568, 48 S. Ct. 141 (1927).
17 Principal case, 138 Ohio St. 352 at 364. See Goldberg v. Preferred Accident
Ins. Co., 279 Mass. 393 at 396, 181 N. E. 1.35 (1932).

